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SETTLING RULE 23 CLASS ACTIONS AT THE PRECERTIFICATION STAGE: IS NOTICE REQUIRED?
MICHAEL A. ALMONDt

The rule 231 federal class action is in conception and by design a
plaintiff-oriented remedy. When it works properly, it obtains for deserving
t Member, Charlotte, North Carolina Bar; A.B. 1971, J.D. 1975, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill; Law Clerk to the Honorable J. Braxton Craven, Jr., 1975-1976.
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 reads as follows:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common
to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if
the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(I) The prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would
as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to
the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that
a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest
of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy
already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained; Notice;
Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a
class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An
order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended
before the decision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct
to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances,
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable
effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him from
the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or
not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who
does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his
counsel.
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plaintiffs maximum relief at minimum cost to litigants and society. 2 Class
victories on the merits not only serve the policy goals of class litigation, but
3
also vindicate the substantive and procedural aspects of the rule.
There is, however, another side to class litigation, one that has nothing
to do with the merits, if any, of the class' claims and that leaves the
mechanism vulnerable to abuse. Too often class actions are instituted
against carefully selected defendants solely to obtain cash settlements for
plaintiffs and fees for their attorneys. The sheer magnitude of class action
litigation and the expense and complexity of defending class claims often
convince these defendants that a one-sided, undeserved cash settlement is
preferable to whatever Pyrrhic victory might be won after months, if not
years, of protracted litigation on the merits. "Strike suits," 4 of course, are
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision
(b)(l) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe those
whom the court finds to be members of, the class. The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable to the class,
shall include and specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision
(c)(2) was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds
to be members of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class
action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses
and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be
construed and applied accordingly.
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which this rule
applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1)
determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the
presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the members
of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such
manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action,
or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify
whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present
claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on
the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that
the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural matters. The orders
may be combined with an order under Rule 16, and may be altered or amended as may
be desirable from time to time.
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or
compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court
directs.
2. See generally Lesar, Class Suits and the FederalRules, 22 MINN. L. REV. 34 (1937);
Moore, FederalRules of Civil Procedure:Some Problems Raised by the PreliminaryDraft, 25
GEo. L.J. 551, 570-76 (1937); Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 ILL. L. REV. 307
(1937); Moore & Cohn, FederalClass Actions-urisdiction and Effect of Judgment, 32 ILL. L.
REV. 555 (1938).

3. The historical and policy antecedents of present day rule 23 are discussed in 3B
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.02 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as MOORE] and 7 C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 1751 (1972).

4. In one view a strike suit is a suit without merit brought in the hope of coercing a
nuisance-value settlement. According to another view, a strike suit is a meritorious
suit instituted primarily for the purpose of settlement. It is, in fact, this latter notion
which clashes most directly with the view that settlement is a desirable way to alleviate
court congestion. The explanation for the apparent anomaly lies in the representative
nature of class and derivative actions and in the kind of settlement sought by a strike
suiter.
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not intended to be tried on the merits; if a plaintiff's tactics resuit in a
settlement the class action mechanism has been successfully abused. The
class action strike suit, which is filed solely to cower defendants into
settlement negotiations, has been roundly criticized as a "Frankenstein
7
monster," 5 "legalized blackmail," 6 and an "engine of destruction."
Class actions do not spring full-grown from plaintiff counsel's brow.
At the outset, the class aspects of a newly filed lawsuit are merely matters of
allegation. The class must prove its viability as a class.8 Only when a
federal district court is satisfied that the requirements of rule 23 have been
met 9 will an order be issued certifying the class. As a result of this
procedure, class actions are subject to abuse at several different stages.
Once the class has been certified, it is usually only a matter of time
before the defendant will offer to settle the case. 10 Most class actions never
reach trial. 1' Defendants usually attempt, successfully, to accommodate the
claims of a certified class through compromise and settlement.12 This
familiar pattern (filing suit, class certification, settlement) manifests itself
not only when a guilty defendant simply throws in the towel rather than
postpone the inevitable, but also in those cases in which an innocent
defendant, unable to bear the expense, embarrassment and disruption of
class litigation, pays whatever is necessary to be rid of the affair once and
Dole, The Settlement of Class Actions for Damages, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 971,.974 (1971)
(footnote omitted); see, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41

(1975); Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 371-72 (1966). See also Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. at 755-61 (Powell, J., concurring).
5. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 572 (2d Cir. 1968) (Lumbard, C.J.,

dissenting).
6. Handler, The Shift From Substantive to ProceduralInnovations in Antitrust SuitsThe Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 9 (1971).

7. Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375 (1972).
8. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b), (c)(1), quoted in note 1 supra. In practice,
however, the burden of proof has shifted to the class defendant, who, typically, is called upon

to disprove class viability. "The procedural posture of the certification hearing has sometimes
caused courts to decide certification issues on the basis of presumptions-historically with a

bias in favor of class treatment." Developments in the Law--ClassActions, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1318, 1423 (1976) [hereinafter cited as HarvardStudy].
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1), quoted in note 1 supra.

10. As the Harvard Study, supra note 8, at 1373, has noted, "[I1n practice, few class
actions are fully litigated. Most class actions for damages are either dismissed before trial or
settled .... "
Certification of a class can transform a relatively simple lawsuit between named

parties into a highly complex case involving thousands and even millions of "plaintiffs" who are brought before the court solely by the boilerplate class allegations of a
complaint, and their failure to "opt out" in response to "notice" which they may

never receive and, if received, may not understand. ...
Simon, supra note 7, at 377.
11.

HarvardStudy, supra note 8, at 1536.

12. See generally Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Note,
The Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action: An EmpiricalStudy, 62 GEO. L.J. 1123 (1974).
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for all. The failure in either case to resolve matters on the merits means that
"[t]he distinctions between innocent and guilty defendants and between
those whose violations have worked great injury and those who have done
little if any harm become blurred, if not invisible. The only significant issue
becomes the size of the ransom to be paid for total peace."' 3 The policy
goals of rule 23 have been served in such cases only if the defendant is
actually guilty, a fact known only to the parties who, as a typical condition
14
of the settlement, are not talking.
Rule 23 is also subject to abuse at the precertification stage. During this
interim period between filing and a decision on the issue of class certification, the attention of the district court is directed not to the merits of the case
but rather to rule 23 issues.15 As one court has noted,
Rule 23 abuse is at its height during the precertification stage when
the defendant is literally threatened by potential class-wide liability. Because the existence of a class has not been determined, the
likelihood increases that plaintiff and his counsel will unduly sacrifice the previously-asserted class interest for private gain. 6
Since no class has been determined, the named plaintiff's counsel can be
flexible in his settlement overtures. He or she will, of course, attempt to
negotiate a class settlement because the payoff normally should exceed any
individual claim. Confronted with a stubborn defendant, however, counsel
may offer to forget about the class if defendant will merely satisfy the
individual claims of the named plaintiff. Should this fail to produce a
satisfactory settlement offer, and if the merits of plaintiff's claims are at best
speculative, counsel is forced to make his bottom-line (but most typical and
familiar) proposition: acceptance of the strike suit/nuisance value settlement. For a token sum, plus attorney's fees, counsel offers to abandon the
lawsuit altogether and to dismiss the individual plaintiff's claim with prejudice. Defendant, rather than bear the expense and burden of precertification
class discovery and related legal proceedings, 17 usually agrees and the case
is settled. Such abuse of the legal process18 victimizes "class" defendants
13. Handler, supra note 6, at 9. "The need for prudent exercise of this discretion [to
certify a class action] is particularly great because certification of a class in not appealable, and
because . . . certification of a broad class often determines the entire case by coercing the
defendants to settle even unmeritoriousclaims." Simon, supra note 7, at 380 (emphasis added).
14. When the defendant is genuinely innocent, "Such a use of the class action may
properly be called an abuse, because none of the policies underlying the creation of the device
are advanced." HarvardStudy, supra note 8, at 1540 (footnote omitted).
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) & (b), quoted in note I supra.
16. Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61, 66-67 (S.D. Tex. 1977).

17. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); text accompanying
notes 144 & 145 infra.

18. See note 14 supra. Such conduct by the plaintiff bar is not a figment of the defense
bar's imagination. "In its crudest form, this sort of compromise involves a sellout by the named
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and cheapens the legal profession. Yet it is a fact of modern legal practice
that occurs with dismaying frequency. 19
plaintiff and the class attorney, in which they agree to discontinue the class suit in return for
personal reward." HarvardStudy, supra note 8, at 1537.
[Clorporate management naturally tends to seek insurance against whatever slight
chance of success plaintiffs may have. Such insurance is usually available for a
comparatively modest premium in the form of a settlement with the attorney who
initiated the litigation and who purports to speak for vast numbers of people who have
not retained him.
Simon, supra note 7, at 389-90. "This Court can only add that until such time as Rule 23 is
revised, existing law clearly compels a court to monitor settlements in this legal area so that an
honored profession does not deteriorate in the eyes of the public to the level of a racket."
Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61, 78 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 was completely rewritten in 1966. See generally id., Advisory
23.02-1, at 23-121 to -126; C. WRIGHT & A.
Committee's Notes; MOORE, supra note 3,
MILLER,

supra note 3, § 1753.

Because the scope of permissible federal class actions was expanded, the potential for and
incidence of abuse has increased greatly. The vast majority of class actions filed in recent years
have been civil rights cases, although securities, antitrust and consumer cases account for a
significant percentage. The Harvard Study, supra note 8, published the following statistics
provided by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts:
CLASS ACTIONS COMMENCED BY NATURE OF SUIT

Total Suits
Total Statutory
Actions
Antitrust
Total Civil Rights
Civil Rights
Prisoner Petitions
Securities Laws
Other

FY1973
2654 100.0%
2269
157
1539
1248
291
235
338

FY1974
2717 100.0%

85.5% 2336
5.9%
114
58.0% 1592
47.0% 1294
11.0%
298
8.9%
305
12.7% 325

86.0%
4.2%
58.6%
47.6%
11.0%
11.2%
12.0%

FIRST-HALF

FIRST-HALF

FY1975
1221 100.0%

FY1976
1886 100.0%

1069
77
767
621
146
81
144

CLASS ACTIONS PENDING ON DECEMBER

Total
Antitrust
Total Civil Rights
Civil Rights
Prisoner Petitions
Securities Laws

5791
450
3459
2851
608
n.a.

87.5% 1707
95
6.3%
62.8% 1268
50.8% 1061
12.0%
207
6.6%
122
11.8% 222

90.5%
5.0%
67.2%
56.2%
11.0%
6.5%
11.8%

31, 1975

100.0%
7.8%
59.7%
49.2%
10.5%

Id. at 1325 n.30 (sources omitted). See also Simon, supra note 7, at 375 n.3 (class actions in
consumer cases).
Not surprisingly, in each of these areas of the law federal statutes authorize recovery of
attorneys' fees. See generally Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,
260 n.33 (1975) (citing statutes). "The large fees that class actions can generate may create a
conflict of interest between the attorney and the named plaintiffs and can provide an incentive
to abuse the class action process by bringing suits of questionable legal merit." HarvardStudy,
supra at 1581-82 (footnote omitted).
[Tihe most serious long-range consequence of the indiscriminate use of class actions
[is] the undermining of public confidence in the judicial system and the integrity of the
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Settlements may reflect abuse of the class action mechanism, may
occur before or after the class is certified 20 and may encompass the claims of
the class as a whole or only those of one or more named plaintiffs. This

article will focus upon the increasing frequency of precertificationsettlements of individualplaintiffs' claims and the role of federal district courts in
supervising and monitoring such settlements.
I.

THE

NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

A few generalizations must be stated: Civil rights cases constitute by
far the greatest percentage of class actions filed, 21 and allegations of em-

ployment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
196422 provide the basis for many of these cases.2 3 Moreover, "it is a rare
Title VII complaint that does not contain a class allegation . ...24 Most
Title VII "class actions" are settled at the precertification stage and typically provide only for the named plaintiff. 25 Since the class is never certified,
notice of the filing of the lawsuit is usually not sent to alleged class
members. 26 Precertification settlement of the named plaintiff's claim is
without prejudice to other members of the alleged class, who are not bound
by the settlement and are free to file their own lawsuits against the settling
defendant. 27 The statute of limitations is tolled as to the claims of the alleged
bar. Attorneys are members of an honorable profession and are duty-bound to put
their clients interests above their own. The spectacle of lawyers reaping enormous
profits from lawsuits which do not benefit their clients must be a source of embarrassment to both the judiciary and the bar. As one Court recently warned, both courts and
attorneys must avoid the criticism implicit in the Italian proverb that "A lawsuit is a
fruit tree planted in a lawyer's garden."
The judiciary should not participate in encouraging attorneys to become entrepreneurs who create business opportunities from which they reap large profits. The heart
of professional immorality in class action fees is what one Court has called "the
contingent fee syndrome."
Simon, supra note 7, at 390-91 (footnotes omitted).
20. Precertification abuse may even occur before the alleged class action is filed. See text
accompanying notes 67-69 idfra.
21. See HarvardStudy, supra note 8,at 1325 n.30 table, reprintedin note 19 supra.
22. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
23. See, e.g., Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Rodgers v.
United States Steel Corp., 70 F.R.D. 639 (W.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed, 541 F.2d 365 (3d Cir.
1976); Duncan v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 66 F.R.D. 615 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Booth v.
Prince George's County, 66 F.R.D. 466 (D.Md. 1975); American Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Harlow, 65
F.R.D. 572 D. Md. 1974); Held v. Missouri P.R.R., 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 772 (S.D. Tex.
1974); EEOC v. Mobil Oil Corp., 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 727 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Muntz v. Ohio
Screw Prods., 61 F.R.D. 396 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Baham v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 55
F.R.D. 478 (W.D. La. 1972).
24. Magana v. Platzer Shipyards, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61, 76 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
25. See id. at 63 n.2, 78.
26. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2), quoted in note I supra.
27. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974); Katz v. Carte Blanche
Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 759-62 (3rd Cir. 1974).
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class when the settling plaintiff files his "class action," and does not begin
to run again until his case is dismissed.28 Finally, it is likely that a plaintiff
class never in fact existed, 29 and that class allegations were at best an
"afterthought," 30 at worst, calculated to intimidate the defendant into a
settlement.
A typical employment discrimination case can be used to illustrate the
problem. An employer, Acme Company, discharges an employee, Green,
who falls within a protected category under Title VII. The reasons for the
discharge are, for present purposes, irrelevant. Green promptly files an
employment discrimination claim against Acme with the local office of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and consults an attorney who,
on a contingent fee basis, agrees to represent him. One hundred eighty days
pass without word from the EEOC concerning investigation or conciliation
of Green's claim. 3' Green's attorney, therefore, requests and receives a
"notice-of-right-to-sue" letter32 from the EEOC authorizing Green to file
33
suit against Acme within ninety days of receipt of the letter.
At this point, Green's attorney probably has done nothing to ascertain
whether his client's claim is essentially an individual grievance or one
representative of similar claims of a class of individuals. 34 Nevertheless,
counsel files a complaint that names as plaintiffs Green "and all others
similarly situated," thereby initiating a "class action." Soon thereafter,
Acme is served with a twenty-page set of form interrogatories relating to
past and present employees, salaries, job classifications, promotions, fringe
benefits, working conditions, hiring and recruitment policies, past discharges and terminations, breakdowns by sex, age and race. At some time
before the answers to these interrrogatories are due, Acme's counsel receives a telephone call from Green's attorney, who informs him that Green
28. See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 549 (1974); Wheeler,
Predismissal Notice and Statutes of Limitationsin FederalClass Actions After American Pipe
and Construction Co. v. Utah, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 771 (1975).
29. A defendant who truly fears class-wide liability is not likely to settle piecemeal with
individual plaintiffs, but normally would prefer to have the class certification issue resolved

before entering into settlement negotiations. The defendant who has little to fear from a ruling
upon class certification, who is confident that its risk exposure to the putative "class" is

negligible, will most likely agree to settle the individual plaintiff's claims for their nuisance
value. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 7, at 390.
30. Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).

31. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (Supp. V 1975) (if 180 days pass after the filing of a

charge without a conciliation agreement between the parties, the aggrieved party shall be

notified that a civil action may be brought).
32. See EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25(c)(d) (1976).
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975) ("within ninety days after the giving of

such notice a civil action may be brought").
34. See Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61, 78 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
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is prepared to settle the case for cash plus attorney's fees. Acme, staggered
by the burden of compiling the information required to respond to Green's
discovery, agrees to a settlement, usually in the one to three thousand dollar
35
range.
But what about the class? Acme has bought its peace only with Green.
Because no class was ever certified Green's settlement cannot bind other
members of the purported class. 36 Furthermore, the filing by Green of an
alleged class action tolls the applicable statute of limitations as to the class
from the moment of filing until the date of dismissal of Green's claim.37 The
class, if one exists, appears to be fully protected, its members free to pursue
their individual or collective claims against Acme, unprejudiced by Green's
voluntary dismissal. 38
At this point complications most often arise. Voluntary dismissals with
prejudice are governed by rule 41(a), 39 which by its terms permits dismissal
by stipulation without order of the court, except in those cases where rule
23(e) applies.' In the example outlined above, the issue of the applicability
of rule 23(e) is of paramount importance, for if it applies, the settlement that
seemed simple and straightforward becomes infinitely more complex. Rule
23(e) issues have troubled and confused many federal judges, and more
often than not those who have wrestled with the problem have either reached
the wrong conclusion or have somehow stumbled upon the correct result for
all the wrong reasons.
A.

Background of Rule 23(e)

Rule 23(e) in its present form is a product of the 1966 amendment to
rule 23.41 "The purpose of subdivision (e) is to protect the nonparty
members of the class from unjust or unfair settlements affecting theirrights
when the representatives become fainthearted before the action is ad35. See id. at 64 ($3,000 settlement proposed).
36. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
37. See text accompanying note 28 supra.

38. It is doubtful, however, that a viable class actually exists in cases of precertification
individual settlements. See note 29 supra.
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) provides:
(a) Voluntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof.
(1)By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e). . .an action
may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court. . .(ii) by filing a stipulation
of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise
stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice. ...
40. Id. 23(e), quoted in note I supra.
41. See note 19 supra. The origin of rule 23(e) can be traced from former Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(c), 28 U.S.C. app., rule 23(c) (1964), which read as follows:
Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court. If the right sought to be enforced is one defined in
paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of this rule notice of the proposed dismissal or
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judicated or are able to secure satisfaction of their individual claims by a
compromise. "42 Rule 23(e) is thus intended to protect absentee class members against a "sale" of class rights by the named plaintiff who has
undertaken to represent the entire class. 43 It would be manifestly unfair to
hold absentees bound by a settlement negotiated by the representative
plaintiff unless they first had been apprised fully of the terms and conditions
44
of the proposed settlement of their claims.
The rule speaks to settlement of class actions. What, then, of settlements that are negotiated at the precertificationstage but nevertheless affect
the rights of the class as a whole?' If the proposed settlement is directed at
the claims of the class and if settlement is to be accompanied by a voluntary
dismissal with prejudice to class rights, then the policy objectives of rule
23(e) can be fulfilled only by requiring notice to absentee class members,
even though the class has not yet been certified. This precise pyoblem
confronted the district court in Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda
American Brass Co.46 The case involved allegations that a number of
defendants had conspired to violate the federal antitrust laws, resulting in
injury to plaintiff class. Before the class was certified, the named plaintiffs
negotiated a settlement with three of the thirteen defendants, which settlement would have bound the entire class as to those particular defendants.
The district court stated that "[ilt is first necessary to consider whether
Rule 23(e) has any application to an action which, while brought as a class
action, has not yet been determined to be one." 4 7 Noting that the proposed
settlement attempted "to compromise the claims of the class, not just the
named plaintiffs,"' 48 and troubled by potential limitations problems, the
court ruled that:
Whatever uncertainties exist as to the precise status of an
action brought as a class action, during the interim between filing
and the 23(c)(1) determination by the court, it must be assumed to
be a class action for purposes of dismissal or compromise under
compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court
directs. If the right is one defined in paragraphs (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) notice shall
be given only if the court requires it.
Although the language differs, the two versions reflect consistent policy objectives.
42. 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, § 1797, at 226 (emphasis added).
43. E.g., Nesenoff v. Muten, 67 F.R.D. 500, 502 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
44. E.g., Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324, 328 (E.D.
Pa. 1967).
45. The Advisory Committee Notes shed little light on the situation: "Subdivision (e)
requires approval of the court, after notice, for the dismissal or compromise of any class
action." FED. R. Civ. P. 23, Advisory Committee Notes.
46. 42 F.R.D. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
47. Id. at 326.
48. Id. at 327.
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23(e) unless and until a contrary determination is made under
23(c)(1). 49
The court explained that if class certification were later denied, the
individual parties would not be harmed by delaying approval of the proposed settlement until such determination. 50 On the other hand, the court
noted that if class certification were granted, "[T]hen there are absent
parties whose rights should not have been permanently affected without
5
notice." 1
B.

PrecertificationIndividual Settlements

It must be emphasized that the rule in PhiladelphiaElectric was
established in response to an attempt to settle certain claims of the class as a
whole, not merely the individual claims of the named plaintiffs. Although
the court clearly recognized the difference and hinted broadly that rule 23(e)
might not apply to precertification settlement of individual claims, 2 this
distinction was, unfortunately, not explicity drawn in the court's broad
holding. As a result, a number of district courts have relied upon Philadelphia Electric in holding that precertification settlements of individual
claims are subject to the rule 23(e) notice requrement. 53 These courts, in
extending the PhiladelphiaElectric holding to include individual precertification settlements, have been forced to develop new rationales for so
doing. Some have held that requiring rule 23(e) notice of individual precertification settlements will somehow curb abuse of the class action mechanism by plaintiffs' counsel.54 Another suggests that absentee class members
may have relied upon the pending, uncertified class action to vindicate their
rights and that they should therefore be given notice that the litigation is
being dismissed. 55
49. Id. at 326 (emphasis added).

50. Id. at 326-27.
51. Id. at 327.
52. "It is further contended that Rule 23(e) is not applicable to the present situation, since
what is now sought does not amount to a dismissal or compromise of the entire action. . . . In
an appropriate case, this. . . might well provide an escape from the literal application of Rule
23(e) in class actions." Id.
53. See cases discussed in text accompanying notes 76-103 infra. The rationale of these
cases is difficult to comprehend. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), and Katz v.
Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1974), held that absentee "class" members cannot
be prejudiced or bound by individual settlements. 417 U.S. at 173; 496 F.2d at 758-60. Concern
that the claims of absentees might in the future be barred by applicable statutes of limitation is
also misplaced since in American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974), the
Supreme Court held that running of the statute is tolled until the individual claims are dismissed.
54. See text accompanying notes 76-103 infra.
55. Id.
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C. The Notice Requirement
The fact that notice is required in some cases at the precertification
stage has generally come as a surprise to both parties and has introduced an
unanticipated element into the litigaton.5 6 One of the parties, usually
the defendant, 57 is required to communicate a settlement or dismissal notice
to all members of the uncertified class. In some cases courts have been
satisfied with notices posted on the defendant's business premises 58 or, in
rare cases, publication notice. 59 The typical notice informs the absentee of
the nature of the litigation, the substance of the class allegations and the fact
that the named plaintiff and defendant have agreed to settle that plaintiff's
individual claims. 60 Not only may the notice inform the absent party of the
amount of the settlement, but it may also provide the names and addresses of
the attorneys involved. 6 1 Sometimes the "class members" are even encouraged to seek legal counsel in order to determine what their response to
62
the proposed settlement should be.
With respect to the defensive strategy and tactics of Title VII defendants in particular, the notice requirement is a devastating give-away. This
notice, a legal document bearing the imprimatur of a United States district
court judge, might best be described in the Title VII context as an "invitation to sue letter." The disclosure of a cash settlement will likely prove an
irresistible temptation for many and serve only to solicit new party plaintiffs
for a lawsuit now abandoned by its original champions. The lesson to be
learned by recipients of the notice is that they should sue the named
56. See, e.g., Duncan v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 66 F.R.D. 615 (E.D. Wis. 1975)
(Gordon, J.); Rotzenburg v. Neenah Joint School Dist., 64 F.R.D. 181 (E.D. Wis. 1974)
(Gordon, J.). The court's requirement of rule 23(e) notice caught the parties completely by

surprise in Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), and, for a time, wrecked their
settlement plans.
57. See text accompanying notes 86-98 infra.
58. E.g., Duncan v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 66 F.R.D. 615, 617 (E.D. Wis. 1974).

59. E.g., Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). In form and content,
rule 23(e) notice ought to be "scrupulously neutral," Grunin v. International House of Pan-

cakes, 513 F.2d 114, 122 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975), or at least "neutrally
worded," American Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Harlow, 65 F.R.D. 572, 576 (D. Md. 1974). Yet in most

cases in which notice has been required, the overall tone, from defendants' point of view, has
been unnecessarily inflamatory and provocative. See note 60 infra.

60. The notice required in Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), for

example, began by summarizing the action and identifying the parties. Id. at 502. It then went
on to inform the "class" that the defendant had agreed to pay $13,000 to settle the claim of the

named plaintiff. Id. Finally, the "class" was informed that

"[i]t is a purpose of this Notice to

afford an opportunity to interested parties to seek intervention in this action, to present
arguments pertinent to the pending motions, and to seek, if they be so advised, substitution in
plaintiff's stead as representatives of the alleged class." Id.
61. See, e.g., Duncan v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 66 F.R.D. 615, 618 (E.D. Wis.

1974).
62. See id.; note 60 supra.
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defendant and that, regardless of the merits of the claim, the defendant will
probably pay a considerable sum to settle out of court. Such notices make
63
Title VII defendants helpless targets for additional litigation.
By failing to rule on class maintainability "[a]s soon as practicable"64
and by requiring precertification settlement notice, a district judge can
effectively coerce a defendant into providing relief to an entire class of
persons that has never met its burden under rule 23.65 An individual
settlement at the precertification stage that must be communicated to an

unknown number of unnamed potential plaintiffs is, from the defendant's
perspective, worse than no settlement at all. 66 Members of the plaintiff bar,
who are most likely to read published or posted notices, will immediately
identify the defending party as a "settling defendant," leading to even
greater abuse.

Paradoxically, the notice requirement may actually result in the filing
of fewer class actions. 67 The prospect of precertification notice will provide
63. The dilemma of defendants confronted with an order requiring rule 23(e) notice of
individual precertification settlements can be demonstrated by the following example. PI sues
D, claiming to represent a class of 100 potential plaintiffs. P1 settles his individual claim against
D, but the court requires precertification notice to the remaining 99 "class members." Sensing
a windfall, P2 (one of the 99) then sues D for himself "and others similarly situated." As
expected, P2 settles with D prior to class certification. Will D be required to send out a second
notice to the remaining 98? And if P3, P4 and P5 settle their individual claims respectively, must
D repeatedly notify the dwindling members of a "class" which has never been called upon to
prove its viability under rule 23? By the time P50 has received 49 legal settlement notices signed
by a federal district judge, can it reasonably be expected that P50 will not have gotten the
message-that he will not, in turn, file his own "class action"? Add the fact that this succession
of individual "class actions" tolls the statute of limitations on all outstanding potential claims,
thus extending D's risk exposure far beyond the anticipated time limits of the appropriate
statute of limitations. This aspect of American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538
(1974), has been sharply criticized by Wheeler, supra note 28, at 780-90, 804-09.
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1), quoted in note 1 supra.
65. Further, postponing the resolution of all other issues until the class action determination has been made deprives defendants of their ability to dispose of invalid or
otherwise improper claims with alacrity. Thus, motions to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted and all other procedures historically developed
to rid the courts and defendants of clearly undeserving plaintiffs could be circumvented by a plaintiff for some period of time simply by alleging the existence and representation of a class. Indeed, if the class alleged is vast enough and problematical enough,
discovery on the class action issue might drag on for several months. The result would
be waste of scarce judicial resources and lack of fairness for defendants.
The absence of fairness bears analysis, since the degree of unfairness will vary
according to the circumstances. Consider first the case in which neither the named
plaintiff nor any other member of the alleged class could survive a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Even in such a case,
disallowing such a motion until after the 23(c)(1) determination would require the
defendant to litigate all aspects of the class action determination, since that determination goes first and since one can never be certain that the subsequent motion to dismiss
will be granted. Thus, despite the absence of any valid claim, the defendant must
litigate for what might be a substantial period at what might be substantial expense.
Wheeler, supra note 28, at 798-99.
66. E.g., Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
67. Measures designed to protect the interest of class members from sellouts by the
class attorney and named plaintiffs may have the undesirable side effect of encourag-
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plaintiffs with a powerful new weapon at the prefilingstage,68 because once
the class action is filed the notice requirement deprives the defendant of the
ability to settle privately with named plaintiffs. Employees in Title VII cases
will argue successfully that if the employer does not settle immediately, a
pro forma class action will be filed, triggering the precertification notice
requirement. The employee/plaintiff will know, moreover, that he will most
likely never be called upon to prove a class under rule 23. If the case does
reach the class certification stage, however, plaintiff's inability to prove a
rule 23 class would not undermine the obvious advantages in originally
filing suit as a class action. It thus would be clearly advantageous for
employers to settle Title VII claims at the prefiling stage regardless of their
69
merit or the viability of the looming plaintiff "class."
The policy goals stated by the district courts that have required notice
hardly justify this judge-made extension of rule 23(e). The cases usually
speak of reliance of absentee members upon the purported "class action"
and stress that rule 23(e), if applied in the individual precertification settlement context, will somehow curtail abuse of rule 23 by plaintiffs and their
attorneys. 7° Little, if any, concern is expressed in any of the cases for the
ing attorneys to attempt to negotiate individual settlements before filing a complaint.
Prefiling bargaining is particularly open to abuse: an attorney may threaten to file a
class suit unless the claim of a particular individual is settled. . . . Potential recovery
in a class suit may be so much greater than the individual claim sought to be settled
that the person threatened with class suit may satisfy the individual claim regardless of
the merits of either the individual or the class claim.
HarvardStudy, supra note 8, at 1542 n.33.
68. [U]nder such a rule plaintiffs can wield a bigger cudgel against defendants before
filing complaints by emphasizing that if a complaint is filed, the parties will automatically be locked into costly litigation at least until the court defines the proper class for
notice. Thus, defendants anxious to avoid costly litigation of class action issues will be
put under pressure to settle before a complaint is filed.
Moreover, defendants will surely be less than grateful for a rule that, under the
guise of helping them to avoid coercion from unscrupulous plaintiffs, makes settlement of expensive class action litigation very unlikely once a complaint is filed. Nor
can there be any reasonable doubt that settlement will in fact be so unlikely; for once a
defendant knows that notice of any settlement must be given, he will know that a new
suit or intervention by one or more of the persons receiving notice is likely, thus
destroying the rationale for early, prenotice, preclass-action-determination settlement.
Indeed, if the group to be provided notice is not the alleged class, but is the class
that would have been approved had an affirmative rule 23(c)(1) determination been
made, plaintiffs also will have little incentive to settle before the 23(c)(1) determination. Thus, both sides will be channeled into an all-out litigation of every class action
issue once the complaint is filed, thereby ensuring that every action brought as a class
action will be costly and time-consuming for the parties, the court, and the public.
Wheeler, supra note 28, at 797.
69. Any device which is workable only because it utilizes the threat of unmanageable
and expensive litigation to compel settlement is not a rule of procedure-it is a form of
legalized blackmail. If defendants who maintain their innocence have no practical
alternative but to settle, they have been de facto deprived of their constitutional rights
to a trial on the merits.
Handler, supra note 6, at 388 n.63.
70. See, e.g., cases discussed in text accompanying notes 76-103 infra.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

defendant's plight. The defendant, who is the party directly abused by the
plaintiff's machinations, should not, having settled with the plaintiff, be
required to endure additional manhandling.
II.

ROLE OF THE DISTRIcT COURTS

The problem addressed by this article may be summarized as follows:
Plaintiff files a complaint alleging specific individual claims and making
general, pro forma class allegations. Prior to certification of the class, the
parties reach settlement of plaintiff's individual claims only. Plaintiff and
defendant seek to dismiss the action with prejudice to the plaintiff's individual claims; the class claims, if any, are not prejudiced. In this situation,
what are the obligations and the responsibilities of the federal district court
under rule 23(e)?
Reported cases disclose sharp division in the courts' perception of their
role. No consistent pattern emerges, and the level of analysis is, for the most
part, uncharacteristically shallow, perhaps suggesting the great difficulties
confronting a federal district judge who would impose conditions upon
settlement that neither of the legal advocates desires. The court is left to find
its own way through the rule 23(e) maze because the legal entity the judge
strives to protect, the absentee class, may not exist and is certainly unrepresented in the pending proceedings. It is perhaps understandable that the
rationale offered by the district courts, as they attempt to protect hypothetical legal rights, is itself based on speculation and conjecture. Cases requiring that the uncertified class be given notice of individual settlements are
invariably cast in a "might be, maybe, what if?" tone.
The cases fall into three rough categories. First, there are those that
expand the PhiladelphiaElectric7 holding beyond the class and require
notice of individual settlements, citing as justification potential curbing of
abuse and protection of reliance interests. 72 Second, a number of cases
dutifully follow the PhiladelphiaElectric line, but dispense with notice on
the basis of a second, corollary holding stated in PhiladelphiaElectric73 and
other cases: precertification notice of dismissal need not be given if the court
concludes as a matter of law that the class would not have been certified, or
if the class allegations are otherwise dismissed on the merits. 74 When
confronted with a settlement proposal relating only to individual claims,
courts in this second group simply proceed to decide the class certification
71.
72.
73.
74.

42 F.R.D. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
See text accompanying notes 76-103 infra.
42 F.R.D. at 326.
See text accompanying notes 104-46 infra.
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issue on the merits, usually holding that the class would never have been
certified and that there is no one to whom notice can be given. Although this
logic has a certain charm, the goals of preventing abuse and protecting
reliance are not promoted by resort to legal fiction. These cases reach the
proper result, but for the wrong reasons.
Finally, there are cases in which the courts correctly perceive that
notice of individual precertification settlements is not required because: (1)
rule 23(e) does not apply; (2) abusive practice will not be curtailed by
requiring such notice; (3) no policy objectives are served absent clear proof
of reliance by absentee "class" members; and (4) the burden of giving
75
notice is unfair to the defendant in the uncertified class action.
A.

Cases Requiring Notice

Yaffe v. DetroitSteel Corp.7 6 involved an alleged class of Detroit Steel
shareholders who challenged the legality of a tender offer. After filing, the
named plaintiffs made no effort to have a class certified despite repeated
prodding by the trial judge. While the judge was away on vacation (and
contrary to his explicit instructions), plaintiffs approached an emergency
motions judge and requested leave to delete the class allegations of their
complaint. The motion was granted and plaintiffs negotiated a settlement of
their individual claims and sought to dismiss their action altogether. 77 The
original judge, piqued at plaintiffs' conduct, refused to dismiss and vacated
the amendment allowing deletion of class allegations, holding that such an
amendment constituted an evasion of rule 23(e).78 The court held that the
proposed settlement could not be approved without notice to the as yet
uncertified class because of the possible reliance interest of absentees:
This lawsuit, and the acquisition it challenges, have received publicity in the financial press and, on at least one occasion, counsel
for plaintiffs issued a press release which found its way into The
Wall Street Journal. Moreover, counsel for plaintiffs participated
in drawing up proxy material sent to Detroit Steel shareholders
which mentioned that this lawsuit was filed as a class action. It is
altogetherpossible, therefore, that some class members, choosing
to rely on this lawsuit as theirmeans of redress, have decidednot to
file separate actions. Consequently, permitting this amendment
without79 notice could result in an unwitting forfeiture of their
rights.
75. See text accompanying notes 147-96 infra.
76. 50 F.R.D. 481 (N.D. Il1. 1970).

77. Id at 482.
78. Id. at 483.
79. Id. (emphasis added).
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Although there was some evidence that absentee shareholders could
have learned of the pending action because of the publicity it had received,
the court failed to explain how, in light of Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp.8 0
and Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,8 1 settlement without notice could result
'8 2
in "an unwitting forfeiture of their rights."
The court also held that "such an amendment is an impermissible
abuse of the class action device. Armed with class action allegations in their
complaint, and with the possibility of amendment as of right, the named
plaintiffs have additional leverage when negotiating for settlements of their
individual claims." 8 3 This logic, perhaps valid in the abstract, breaks down
when applied to the facts before the court. If abuse had already occurred,
and if the object of abuse (settlement of individual claims) had been
realized, how could requiring rule 23(e) notice remedy the situation? How
could disallowance of the settlement, combined with notice of its proposal,
help the defendant who was the victim of the abuse? If the court meant to
teach plaintiffs a lesson, the lesson to be learned is that in the future,
sufficient pressure must be applied so that a satisfactory settlement can be
reached prior to the filing of a complaint. 84 From the plaintiff's point of
view, such prefiling agreements are preferable since they are beyond the
supervision and control of the federal district judge. A stated judicial policy
that notice will be required as a matter of course, moreover, provides the
plaintiff with precisely the ammunition he needs to coerce prefiling settlements from potential defendants. Plaintiff's settlement leverage, inherent in
every class action,8 5 will only increase if it is held that defendants may no
longer settle individual claims privately at the precertification stage.
Rothman v. Gould86 involved a similar situation in which a single
plaintiff sought to represent an alleged class of defrauded investors. The
issue of class certification unresolved two years after filing, the named
80. 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1974); see note 53 supra.
81. 417 U.S. 156 (1974); see note 53 supra.
82. 50 F.R.D. at 483.
83. Id.

84. See notes 67-69 and accompanying text supra.
The class action device can be used to coerce a settlement even without filing suit.
Most experienced defense counsel have participated in negotiations toward settlement
of a dispute at which counsel for the potential plaintiff threatens to file a massive class
action to intimidate the potential defendant into a favorable settlement. The weaker
the potential plaintiff's claim, the more likely he is to make such a threat since a
litigant with a valid claim could not expect as large a recovery as a member of a large
class. Where the client in fact has a valid substantial claim, a class action is actually
not in his self-interest.
Simon, supra note 7, at 390.
85. See cases discussed in text accompanying notes 104-46 infra.
86. 52 F.R.D. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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plaintiff agreed to settle his $40,000 claim for $13,000.87 To facilitate the
settlement, plaintiff moved for an order under rule 23(e) denying class
certification on the ground that his class allegations were "no more than an
afterthought." 8 8 This confession no doubt raised the eyebrows of the trial
judge, who refused to strike class allegations unless notice of the proposed
settlement was given to the purported class.8 9 The court reserved judgment
upon the form and content of the notice pending a further hearing. 90 Not
surprisingly, defendant bristled at the introduction of a new and potentially
prejudicial element into the case and withdrew the settlement offer. 91 Plaintiff, reversing his prior position, filed a motion for class certification and
promised that, "[f] the action is determined to be a class action, it is my
intention to prosecute it vigorously." ' 92 Defendant responded by adopting
plaintiff's prior position that the litigation was not properly certifiable as a
class action. In the end, the court concluded that the absentee "class"
should receive notice of the history of the whole tangled affair, but that
publication notice would suffice. 93 As a final indignity, the hapless defendant was saddled with the cost of publishing the required notice in the New
York Times and the Wall Street Journal.94
87. Id.at 495.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 495-96. The tone of the opinion suggests the judge's suspicion that such class
allegations, far from being an "afterthought," were deliberately inserted to maximize the
individual plaintiff's settlement leverage:
It must be presumed, or at least firmly expected, that responsible lawyers, before they
put their names to class allegations, will have made some minimally careful explorations to satisfy themselves of the primafacie existence of a class, a claim on behalf of
the class, and their suitability to present themselves in the fiduciary role of class
Counsel will not be allowed to forget the whole business on the
representatives ....
mere assertion that it was a mistake to begin with.
Id.
Apart from abuse by the named plaintiff, the court also emphasized the possibility of
absentee reliance:
The very bringing of a class action ... may deter the institution of suits by members
of the ostensible class....
In a word, having nominated themselves as class representatives, both plaintiff
and his counsel have undertaken responsibilities, and triggered possible consequences, that may not now be erased by routine acceptance of the resignation they
now tender.
Id. at 496.
90. Id. at 496.
91. Id. at 497.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 498.
94. Id. at 501. Defendant again resisted the notice requirement, pointing out that such
notice "could lead to the spector [sic] of unnecessary litigation." Id. at 499. Plaintiff's counsel
then chimed in, professing shock at "so champertous a notice." Id. at 501. The court brushed
aside these objections as "only a chimera rising in the heat of advocacy." Id. The outcome of
the exchange of florid hyperbole was a steadfast determination by the court to require notice.
The court did, however, suggest that absent some affirmative response by absentees, certification would be denied for lack of a suitable class representative. Id.
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Precertification notice of individual settlements was also required in
Rotzenburg v. Neenah Joint School District9 5 and Duncan v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co. 96 Supporting the view that the momentum and force of legal
precedent are more a function of repetition than analysis, the court in both
cases relied on Rothman and PhiladelphiaElectric to require notice despite
the parties' objections. 97 As it had in Rothman, the court again in Duncan
required defendant to pay for the privilege of announcing to the world that it
would pay cash money to anyone clever enough to file an alleged class
98
action against it.
It should be noted that in both Rotzenburg and Duncan the court stated
no justification for requiring notice beyond its unshakable conviction that
rule 23(e) does apply to precertification individual settlements and dismissals. Only two cases were cited, 9 9 Rothman and PhiladelphiaElectric, and
these only for the "well settled" proposition that "for purposes of rule
23(e), a class action warrants the assumption that the putative class is
viable."' 1 This, apparently, sufficed to warrant the court's insistence on
precertification notice. Concepts of abuse, reliance and protection of absentee class members evidently were thought unnecessary to explain what the
court regarded as the positive mandate of rule 23(e).
In McArthur v. Southern Airways'01 the named plaintiffs in a Title
VII sex discrimination case moved to amend their complaint to delete class
allegations as part of a precertification settlement agreement. Emphasizing
prevention of abuse and the possibility of reliance by absentee class members, 1°2 the Fifth Circuit held "that the district court comitted error in
permitting plaintiffs to delete their class claims under rule 15(a) and proceed
95. 64 F.R.D. 181 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
96. 66 F.R.D. 615 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
97. Id. at 616; 64 F.R.D. at 182.

98. 66 F.R.D. at 616-17. If any evidence is needed that the courts view rule 23 as
fundamentally a plaintiff-oriented remedy, consider Judge Gordon's justification in Duncan for
requiring the defendant to pay the cost of the required notice:
Each party insists that the other should bear the cost of the notice. I have already
indicated that such burden should fall on the defendant. First, the plaintiff is indigent,

and the defendant does not deny that it has the means to finance a method of notice
entailing relatively modest costs. Secondly, although the defendant insists on its lack

of unlawful behavior, the plaintiff's position is vindicated to some extent since the
defendant has agreed to pay him $10,000 in settlement.
Id. (emphasis added). A mutually satisfactory settlement should never be viewed by a court as

a tacit admission by the defendant of liability. As discussed throughout this article, too many
other factors (including plaintiff's abuse and the court's attitude toward rule 23 in general) may
lead a perfectly innocent defendant to settle purported class actions.
99. Rotzenburg, 64 F.R.D. at 182. Duncan cited no cases.
100. Id.
101. [1977] 7 LAB. REL. REP. (15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 1123 (5th Cir., July 22, 1977).
102. Id. at 1127.
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to settlement without first providing the absentee class members with [rule
23(e)] notice of the proposed dismissal." 103
B.

Cases Dispensing With Notice: Lack of Viable Class

PhiladelphiaElectric has been interpreted by some courts as generally
requiring notice while simultaneously providing a loophole whereby the
giving of notice may be avoided. These same courts point to the "unless and
until" reservation in the Philadelphia Electric rule: "[An alleged class
action] must be assumed to be a class action for purposes of dismissal or
compromise under 23(e) unless and until a contrary determination is made
under 23(c)(1)." 1 4 Notice frequently has been dispensed with on the
ground that the class, as a matter of law, could not have been properly
certified. The self-deception inherent in this reasoning is apparent and courts
embracing this theory have failed to explain how a negative determination of
class viability in any way serves the policy objectives perceived in Rothman
and PhiladelphiaElectric.
In Berger v. PurolatorProducts,Inc. ,105 two named plaintiffs and "all
others similarly situated" sued defendant, alleging securities fraud. Their
individual claims were settled without prejudice to the "class," and the
parties sought the "directions" of the district court with respect to rule
23(e). 106 The court, however, believed the proposed settlement required a
10 7
decision on the merits of class certification.
Plaintiffs had done little, if anything, to prove the viability of the
class; 10 8 the court, after reviewing the requirements of rule 23, held that
plaintiffs' allegations failed to merit class action treatment. 109 Class allegations were ordered stricken from the complaint, and the individual settlements were permitted to proceed unimpeded by rule 23(e)." 0
The court in Elias v. National Car Rental System, Inc. II adopted an
imaginative approach in eliminating the notice requirement for a proposed
103. Id.
104. 42 F.R.D. at 326 (emphasis added).
105. 41 F.R.D. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).

106. Id. at 543.
107. "The issue to be determined by the court is whether the consolidated action is
maintainable as a class action under new Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
effective July 1, 1966. If it is not so maintainable,the compromise does not requireapprovalby
the court. Rule 23(e), F.R.C.P." Id. (emphasis added).

108. This is a factor that has been considered by other courts. See, e.g., Magana v. Platzer
Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61, 64 (S.D. Tex. 1977).

109. 41 F.R.D. at 545. "Since none of the requirements of the three subsections of Rule
23(b) have been met, this action is not now maintainable as a class action and approval by the
court of the proposed compromise is not required. Rule 23(e)." Id.
110. Id.
111.59 F.R.D. 276 (D. Minn. 1973).
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settlement of named plaintiff's securities fraud claim. The court, aware that
plaintiff had never moved for certification of his alleged class, held that
plaintiff's intense desire to settle was in and of itself sufficient to undermine
his ability to fairly represent the class:
First it is clear that plaintiff desires to withdraw as a plaintiff
individually and personally. Were it not designated a class action,
this would end the matter. In view of the requirements of rule
23(a)(4) it is clearthat a plaintiffwho desires to withdrawpersonally
as an individual is not one who will fairly represent and adequately
protect the interests of the class. One who wishes to cease his
connection with the case cannot be a true class representative.
There is no one sought to be substituted
for him and so the action
2
must fail for this reason alone."
The purported class was dissolved without notice, and plaintiff's action was
13
dismissed without prejudice to class rights."
Until the very end of its opinion, the court in Muntz v. Ohio Screw
Products14 seemed determined to impose a blanket notice requirement for
all precertification settlements. Citing PhiladelphiaElectric, the court held
that "class treatment of the uncertified suit serves two important policies of
the notice requirement" 1 5 and rejected defendant's protestations that set116
tlements not prejudicial to class rights do not invoke rule 23(e).
After stressing the policy objectives allegedly served by precertification notice, the Muntz court then did a curious thing: "Mindful of the
shortcomings of weighing class certification with neither party forcefully
advocating it, the Court will examine whether the class alleged in this suit is
proper for certification in order to avoid the vain act of giving settlement
notice to an invalid class.""' 7 The result: the class failed "for the reason
112. Id. at 277 (emphasis added).

113. Id.
114. 61 F.R.D. 396 (N.D. Ohio 1973).

115. Id.at 398.
[T]he Court may enter the settlement without notice only if.it determines that this
particular settlement is an exception to the notice requirement.
The first policy served by requiring settlement notice prior to certification is that
of reducing class allegations added solely to enhance the settlement of the representa-

tive plaintiff. The drafters of Rule 23 added the notice requirement to make it
impossible for the class representative to sue and settle in the dark. . . .For purposes
of this policy, the requirement of settlement notice is no less relevant prior to
certification.
Second, requiring notice prior to certification serves the policy of informing those

persons who have refrained from pursuing their own relief in reliance on the representation of the class representative.
Id.
116. Id. at 399.
117. Id. (emphasis added).
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that the class is not too numerous to permit joinder. Rule 23(a)."' 8
The settlement was consummated without notice, a startling turnabout given
the court's attitude toward precertification settlements. In the space of only
six paragraphs, the court first embraced and then abandoned the "important
policies" served by precertification notice. The notice requirement, which
the court regards as mandatory on page 398119 of its opinion, is discarded as
a "vain act" on page 399.120 The court at no point comes to grips with the
proposition that, valid class or not, the named plaintiffs could still be guilty
of abuse, or that absentee "class" members might have relied on the
purported class action.
From a pure policy perspective, the impact of the judge's ruling is the
same as if he had totally rejected the Rothman approach. The perceived
policy objectives of precertification notice certainly cannot be realized if the
notice is not given, regardless of the class' viability under rule 23. Courts
that profess allegiance to the Philadelphia Electric/Rothman line, but
nevertheless refuse to require rule 23(e) notice on grounds that the alleged
class should not be certified, have entangled themselves in a hopeless
logical and legal inconsistency. Their approach does nothing to delineate the
rule 23(e) obligations of a court confronted with precertification individual
settlements.
Yet the district court fell into this trap in Held v. Missouri Pacific
Railway.121 The judge adopted both elements of Philadelphia Electric,
including the "until and unless" proposition,' 22 and employed the device
used in Elias to avoid giving notice: "The court finds a failure on the part of
this individual plaintiff to adequately represent the class with a resulting
nonsatisfaction of rule 23(a)(4)."' 12 3 The court concluded that "with the
question of maintainability resolved, the court is now in a position to
approve an agreed-upon settlement.' ' 24
The proper conclusion must be that the "unless and until" language of
PhiladelphiaElectric is wrong. The need to protect class claims supports
the requirement that an alleged class action be treated as such at the
precertification stage. The same factor militates against allowing district
118. Id.
119. Id.at 398.
120. Id.at 399.
121. Two Held opinions are involved. In the first, Held 1, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 772 (S.D.
Tex. 1974), the district court judge postponed ruling on the parties' motions until trial briefs
were provided. In the second, Held 11, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 774 (S.D. Tex. 1975), the district
court ruled on these motions.
122. Held I, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 773.
123. Held II, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 7-5.
124. Id.
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courts to avoid whatever responsibilities they might have to the alleged class
by making hasty decisions to deny class certification merely because a
proposed settlement is on the table.
The most recent case in this category is also the most carefully reasoned and thoroughly analyzed of rule 23(e) cases; yet the unfortunate
outcome of Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc. 125 clearly illustrates that this
group of cases has relied on the wrong reasons in reaching its results.
Richard T. Magana sued his employer Platzer Shipyard, Inc. on behalf
126
of himself and all "Black and Spanish surnamed American persons,"'
alleging racial and national origin discrimination. As the court noted,
however, apart from Magana's perfunctory list of thirty-seven interrogatories, "no significant effort was made by either counsel to ascertain
whether or not the facts, if discovered, supported the existence of an
' 127
employee class as alleged in the complaint.
Three days after the deadline for discovery and briefing on the class
certification issue had passed, the parties asked the court to approve an
individual settlement, a $3,000 cash payment to Magana. Of this sum,
plaintiff's counsel claimed a 40% contingency, or $1,200. 128 The proposed
settlement, in the court's opinion, left two issues unresolved:
If a class action is alleged by plaintiff but not as yet certified by the
Court, and the proposed settlement is solely on behalf of the named
plaintiff with no provision whatsoever for the putative class members, (1) is notice of the proposed compromise to potential class
members necessary at this time; and (2) is the Court obligated
under the law to review the reasonableness of the attorney's fee to
be collected by plaintiff's counsel, even if the fee is based upon a
contingent
fee arrangement between counsel and the named plain129
tiff?

Noting both that most Title VII claims are brought as alleged class
actions and that the vast majority result in individual settlements at the
precertification stage, the court held that "[t]he possibility for abuse of the
Rule 23 device inherent in such a predictable pattern necessitates that the
court expressly define the contours of its notice and attorney's fees responsibilities under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 in the special context of public-oriented
Title VII litigation." 30 The court made it clear that collusive abuse was not
125. 74 F.R.D. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1977). Although the court in this case strongly hinted that rule
23(e) notice will be invariably required, id. at 63 n.1, 65-66, it is included under this category
because of language that also suggests that a negative decision on class certification would
obviate the need for such notice.

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 63.
at 64.
at 62.
at 63.
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its main concern. Throughout the nineteen page opinion the problem is
defined as class action abuse by plaintiff and his counsel. 13 1 The court's
stated dilemma is how to reconcile the principle of encouraging private
settlements of legal disputes with the simultaneous need to protect against
rule 23 abuse. 132 The court struck the balance in favor of curbing abuse,
even if the result is to complicate privately negotiated settlement arrange133
ments.
Having once decided that class action abuse must be rooted out of Title
VII litigation, the court then put forward two proposals for accomplishing
this objective. The first, strict judicial scrutiny and predismissal approval of
plaintiff's attorney's fee arrangements, 134 certainly cannot be faulted. Such
a policy will likely deter abuse with little, if any, negative effect upon
defendants. 135 The other, rule 23(e) notice to the putative class, 136 not only
will not deter abuse, but will prove grossly unfair to defendants who are the
target of abuse. Citing Yaffe, the Magana court held that: "The possibility.
of notice to absent class members and the soliciting of their objections, if
any, to the disclosed settlement can serve as a deterrent to collusion on the
part of the private parties to the litigation and help guarantee an adequate
consideration of the class interest. ' 137 As discussed earlier, however, it is
by definition impossible for rule 23(e) notice to deter abuse that has already
138
occurred in a pending case, or to undo abuse that has already been done.
To implement its policies, the court promulgated certah procedures to
be followed in every precertification individual settlement case. In addition
to furnishing copies of the proposed compromise and dismissal, the parties
are required to provide information dealing with the history of settlement
negotiations, the details of the settlement "package," the viability of the
alleged class, absentee reliance and attorneys' fees. 139 The court also suggested that the parties' responses, considered with the results of discovery
on the class certification issue, may result in an order denying class certification, thus permitting settlement as planned without notice. 14° The clear
implication is that the court will, at that stage, make some ruling on class
certification.
131. See, e.g., id. at 71-78.
132. Id. at 64.
133. Id. at 68. The court considered and rejected the Rothman "reliance interest"

rationale, instead regarding itself "compelled to place greater emphasis on the 'prevention of
abuse' aim delineated above." Id. at 66.
134. Id. at 67, 72.
135. Id. at 71-72.

136. Id. at 67.
137. Id. at 68 (citing Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp., 50 F.R.D. 481 (N.D. Ii. 1970)).
138. See text accompanying notes 83-85 supra.
139. 74 F.R.D. at 78-79.

140. Id. at 79.
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The next step presumes a valid class and, as a result, rule 23(e)'s
applicability. At this point, the court would make a preliminary determination concerning the reasonableness of the proposed "settlement offer" (read
"attorney's fee") as to the individual plaintiff and would make the rulings
required to "ensure that the proposed compromise and dismissal is without
prejudice to the rights of the putative class members." ' Then, if satisfied
that the settlement is reasonable, the court would determine whether notice is
necessary, presumably on the basis of its "prevention of abuse" rationale.
This process would involve at least one, possibly two, additional hearings. 142 Finally, after notice is given, yet another hearing would be held to
determine the future of the alleged class in the event some absentee "class"
member should appear to object to the settlement, intervene in the action or
assume control of the class action as a named plaintiff. 143
After all this, the settlement may then be approved and the plaintiff's
claims dismissed. 144 The defendant, of course, may have completed only the
first of many journeys through this complicated procedural nightmare, for a
number of identical suits, provoked by the 23(e) notice and perhaps involving the same plaintiffs' attorney, may be lurking in the background.
The real problem with the Magana settlement procedure is that it failed
to take into account what is perhaps the most compelling motive for
settlement. Magana and all other courts that depend upon rule 23(c)(1)
certification to trigger rule 23(e), and that rely upon a negative 23(c)(1)
ruling to excuse their 23(e) responsibilities, overlook a crucial fact of
contemporary class action practice: in many' cases, if not the majority,
defendants agree to settle class actions not because they fear classwide
liability or exposure, but rather because they are prepared as a business
proposition to pay plaintiff some nominal amount in order to avoid the
enormous costs in time, personnel and legal expense involved in the discovery and legal skirmishing leading up to the 23(c)(1) certification hearing.
It is generally recognized that to avoid class certification, the defendant
bears the burden of disproving class viability. 4 5 This, of course, is back141. Id.
142. Id.

If the Court concludes that notice is necessary, the views of all counsel will be
solicited as to (1) the form and contents of the notice, (2) who should receive notice of
the proposed dismissal, and (3) which party should bear the cost of the notice. . . .In
addition, a hearing date will be set at which the objections of class members can be
heard and evaluated.

Id. at 80.
143. See id. at 80.
144. Id.
145. See note 8 supra.
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wards, but it is a fact of life. Accordingly, what defendant would spend
$5,000 to defeat class certification when the named plaintiff is prepared to
settle for $2,000? Furthermore, it is precisely this defendant, confident that
class certification could be defeated, who is likely to be unconcerned about
future suits by absentee members of a nonexistent class and who feels
comfortable settling with the individual plaintiff.
A court that requires resolution of the class certification issue before
determining its 23(e) responsibilities defeats the settling defendant's expectation that the matter will be resolved cleanly, quickly and privately. Rule
23(c)(1) proceedings and settlement approval procedures like those promulgated in Magana undermine defendants' primary incentive to settle. The
complications involved in having an individual settlement approved in the
Magdna court are even more burdensome and involved than class certification itself; indeed, resolution of the class issue is part, but only a part, of the
whole Magana settlement process.146 Whatever the responsibilities of federal courts might be in the precertification individual settlement context, the
cases in this category have clearly missed the point.
C. Cases Holding No Notice Required: Inapplicabililtyof Rule 23(e)
A number of courts have concluded that precertification notice is not
required. They have correctly discerned that 23(e) simply does not apply in
the precertification individual settlement context and that no policy objectives of rule 23 are served by requiring notice. These cases have been
decided correctly and can furnish the analytical framework for the flexible
approach to rule 23(e) advocated in Part I of this article.
1. Rule 23(e) Does Not Apply 4 7
Most rule 23(e) cases share a common ancestor, Philadelphia
146. Even if 23(e) notice is not required in a Magana-type procedure, plaintiff, who is
presumed to have abused rule 23, is afforded infinitely greater settlement leverage by the mere
existence of so complicated a settlement process. The prospect of suffering through a settle-

ment proceeding, coupled with the obvious negative aspects of rule 23(e) notice (which will
probably be required) will no doubt ensure that a defendant will promptly yield under plaintiff's
threats and settle at the prefiling stage rather than risk its sanity in such a "procedural

monstrosity." Dole, supra note 4, at 971.
147. Professor Wheeler thinks this issue has already been decided by the United States

Supreme Court. In Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), the Court held that "''foince the suit is
certified as a class action, it may not be settled or dismissed without the approval of the
court.'" Id. at 399 n.8, quoted in Wheeler, supra note 28, at 775 n.16 (emphasis added by

Wheeler). Wheeler concludes that "[t]he clear implication of the italicized statement is that the
requirement of court approval for settlement or dismissal embodied in rule 23(e) does not apply

until an action has been certified as a class action." Wheeler, supra at 775 n.16a. The district
courts have rejected the broad reach suggested by Wheeler's reading of Sosna's footnote 8.
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Electric."4 Some cases, however, have drawn a crucial distinction that other
courts, unfortunately, have overlooked. 149 They recognize that the broad
holding of PhiladelphiaElectric must be understood in its proper factual
context. As the court there so clearly emphasized, the precertification
settlement was intended to bind the entire class, not just the individual
parties, to the settlement agreement.' 50 Upon this premise, the court's
determination to treat alleged class actions as bona fide class actions, even
at the precertification stage, is both understandable and appropriate. It
would be manifestly unjust, and probably a denial of due process, to
dismiss, compromise or settle the claims of the putative class without
affording its members proper notice and an opportunity to object or intervene. These considerations do not apply, however, when the proposed
settlement affects only the rights of the settling parties. Philadelphia
Electric recognized this,' 5 ' but many courts have simply extended the
PhiladelphiaElectric doctrine to encompass cases in which the dismissal or
settlement is explicitly without prejudice to the class.
The flaw in this expanded interpretation of PhiladelphiaElectric was
prophesied by Judge John J. Parker in Hutchinson v. Fidelity Investment
153
Association, 152 which held that the forerunner of modern-day rule 23(e)
was inapplicable to settlements of individual claims and required notice only
of settlements of the class action itself.' 54 The leading case, however, is
Weight Watchers, Inc. v. Weight Watchers International,Inc. 155 Plaintiff
appealed an order permitting defendant to communicate (under court supervision) with the alleged class. Plaintiff was concerned, apparently, that
defendant's efforts to negotiate settlements with potential class members
might undermine the numerosity required for class certification under rule
23(a)(1). 5 6 Chief Judge Friendly noted that:
This Court cannot accept the negative implication urged by counsel that, in view of the
above-quoted language, Rule 23(e) and its requirement of notice should not be presumed to apply prior to class certification. . . . Thus, in view of the unrelated nature
of the question before the Supreme Court to the issues at hand, this Court is unwilling
to attribute any special significance to the above-quoted language.

Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. at 66. See also Duncan v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 66 F.R.D. at 616.
148. 42 F.R.D. 324 (E.D. Pa: 1967), discussed at text accompanying notes 46-51 supra.
149. See text accompanying note 152-65 infra.
150. 42 F.R.D. at 327.
151. Id. at 326-27.
152. 106 F.2d 431 (4th Cir. 1939).
153. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c), 28 U.S.C. app., rule 23(c) (1964); see note 41 supra.

154. 106 F.2d at 436.
155. 455 F.2d 770 (2nd Cir. 1972).
156. Id. at 772-73.
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Indeed, we are unable to perceive any legal theory that would
endow a plaintiff who has brought [a class action].

. .

with a right

to prevent negotiation of settlements between the defendant and
other potential members of the class who are of a mind to do this; it
is only the settlement of the class action itself without court approval that .R. Civ.P. 23(e) prohibits.
Here, even if defendant should succeed in settling with so
many franchisees that the court will be forced to deny class action
status, plaintiff's complaint will remain untouched. As we have, in
essence, already noted, plaintiff has no legally protected right to
sue on behalf of other franchisees who prefer to settle; F.R.Civ.P.
23(e), requiring court approvalof the dismissal or compromise of a
class action, does not bar non-approvedsettlements with individual
members which have no effect upon the rights of others.157
Although Weight Watchers did not cite Philadelphia Electric, the important distinction left unstated in the earlier case was clearly recognized:
23(e) is inapplicable when the class is not affected.
In Nesenoff v. Muten, 158 class representatives contended that settlement offers made to potential class members constituted a settlement or
compromise of the "class action" without court approval. The court responded:
Rule 23(e), Fed. R. Civ. P. is designed to guard against the
possibility of a self-appointed class representative unilaterally settling or compromising his claim in derogation of the rights of the
class as a whole. .

.

.Here, no such problem exists . .

.

.By

accepting the offer, these potential class members have chosen to
settle their claims through a relinquishment of their rights. However, such settlements do not affect the rights of the otherpotential
class members. The plaintiffs' class action complainthas not been
disturbed, nor have the other potential class members been prohibitedfrom intervening in the instantsuit or commencing their own
suit in the event that the plaintiffs' class action motion is denied.15 9
The Nesenoff court also rejected the suggestion that it should nevertheless
play a supervisory role in approving or disapproving the terms of settlement.160
157. Id. at 773, 775 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
158. 67 F.R.D. 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
159. Id. at 502-03 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

160. Rule 23(e), Fed. R. Civ. P. is not intended to insure court supervision of the
settlement of potential class member claims with a view towards the economic viability of intervention or commencement of separate lawsuits in the event that the
numerosity requirement is eliminated. . . .As a result, Rule 23(e), Fed. R. Civ. P. not
being applicable, there is no legal authority under which this court may undertake such
a supervisory role.

Id. at 503 n.4. See also American Fin. Sys. Inc. v. Harlow, 65 F.R.D. 572 (D. Md. 1974);
Moreland v. Rucker Pharmacal Co., 63 F.R.D. 611 (W.D. La. 1974).
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In Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp. ,161 workers brought a class
action alleging racial discrimination. Defendant sought to settle the individual claims of a number of potential class members by tendering back
pay. 162 Approving the settlement, the court held:
Plaintiffs . . . insist that the tender of back pay to eligible
black employees at the Homestead Works who are members of the
Rodgers class constitutes a settlement of that class action and is
therefore directly governed by the requirements of Rule 23(e) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. I do not agree. . . . [A] brief
considerationof rule 23(e) reveals that neither itsplain languagenor
its underlying rationaleembraces the circumstancespresentedhere.
[emphasis added].
By its terms, Rule 23(e) applies and is limited to dismissal or
compromise of a class action itself . . where application of its
strictures is necessary to protect the rights of absentee or nonparty
class members who may be bound or affected by a settlement of
their claims by their class representatives. . . . In contrast, the
Rule does not attach to direct settlements with individual class
members which have no effect upon the rights of others ...
* * * The tender of back pay now at issue can in no way be
deemed to constitute a settlement of the Rodgers class action itself.
It is, rather, a compromise offer, made pursuant to a negotiated
consent decree, to individual class members who are free to accept
or reject it as they see fit. Those at Homestead who reject the
tender will be neither bound nor prejudiced by the acceptance of
others or by the Alabama settlement itself. 163
There is thus established precedent that rule 23(e) is not applicable to
cases involving precertification individual settlements. This literal inapplicability of 23(e), however, cannot and does not settle the issue. Despite
Nesenoff there remains discretionaryauthority in the district courts to order
notice of any settlement, dismissal or compromise upon whatever terms the
court deems appropriate. Apart from the mandatory language of 23(e), rule
23(d)164 can be read as giving a district court power and discretion to require
161. 70 F.R.D. 639 (W.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed, 541 F.2d 365 (3d Cir. 1976).

162. Id. at 640.
163. Id. at 642-43 (emphasis in original except as indicated) (footnote omitted) (citations
omitted); accord, Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 461 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
A voluntary dismissal under 41(a)(1) is subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e)
which allows the dismissal or compromise of a class action only with the approval of
the Court. However, the languageof 23(e) refers to the dismissaland compromise of the
class action and does not appearto apply with equalforce to individual claims. Thus,

although the class action itself may not be voluntarily dismissed without Court approv-

al and scrutiny, an individual claim in a 23(b)(3) [class] action may be settled and

dismissed at the class member's own initiative.
Id. at 464 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

164. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d), quoted in note 1 supra.
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notice to the putative class of a proposed precertification individual settlement. 165 The question, therefore, is not whether the court must require
notice but whether the court should require notice. The answer involves
important policy considerations, because if no policy goals are served by the
giving of either mandatory or discretionary notice, then notice should not be
required.
2.

No Policy Objectives Served

As noted above, courts that have required notice have done so in order
to prevent or deter abuse of the class action mechanism and to protect those
members of the purported class who may have relied upon the "class
action." 1 Enough has been said to discredit the "prevention of abuse"
rationale. The subject of reliance, however, presents a more stubborn
problem.
It is unlikely that potential members of an uncertified class actually rely
upon an uncertified class action. If they do, certainly theirs is not justifiable
reliance. Although the argument for reliance may have some theoretical
appeal, it is "not supported by a realistic appraisal of the actual amount and
1 67
causes of reliance on pending class actions."
The inadequacies of the reliance theory were drawn sharply into focus
in Magana:
[I]t is axiomatic that potential class members have a more
speculative interest in the litigation than certified class members
and that their expectations therefore should be accorded less
weight. Thus, the "protection of class" function embodied in Rule
23(e), although important, is not paramount in the pre-certification
stage, as it is once a class is actually defined.
Until a class is actually defined, any interest or expectation by
an alleged member in a recovery, monetary orotherwise, againstthe
Defendant must be classified as speculative.168
This theory presumes both a valid class and awareness of the pending,
uncertified class action by a potential member of the presumably valid class.
165. E.g., Dole, supra note 4, at 985; HarvardStudy, supra note 8, at 1548.
166. See text accompanying notes 76-103 supra.

167. Wheeler, supra note 28, at 807.
[1]t is highly unlikely that more than a very few persons would have relied to their

detriment upon a pending class action by not filing their own actions or motions to join

or intervene in the action. . . . [T]he number of people so relying will be so small that
there is no need for any protection; and as long as American Pipe is effective, those
few people will be protected by the tolling of the statute of limitations.
Id. at 790. "An action that has no potential merit or feasibility has only nuisance value and does

not constitute a significant interest of absentees." Dole, supra note 4, at 986.
168. 74 F.R.D. at 67, 69-70 (emphasis added).
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Such presumptions are entirely unjustified when settlement occurs at the
precertification stage unless there is positive evidence of actual reliance. To
require defendants to deal with an alleged but uncertified class as a class
merely because some member of this speculative class might have heard of
the lawsuit contradicts rule 23's prerequisites for class certification that are
designed in part to protect defendants against meritless class allegations.
Reliance was not a factor in PhiladelphiaElectric, and in Elias v.
National Car Rental System, Inc., the court flatly stated that it
does not preceive it has any duty to notify those whom plaintiff's
counsel might claim to be class members of the proposed dismissal.
Rule 23 does not require notice under these circumstances and to
do so is in a sense merely soliciting a client for plaintiff's
69 counsel
under the aegis of the court. This would be improper. 1
As the court observed in Pearson v. Ecological Science Corp. :170
[Amicus curiae for appellants] argues that the district court erred
by failing to require that notice under Rule 23(e), F.R.Civ.P., be
given to members of the asserted class of the proposed settlement.
[These arguments] ignore the difference between a class action and
a non-class action. They place undeserved emphasis upon mere
allegations of class action status by individual plaintiffs...
The appellants have not only failed to show any prejudice to
nonparty members of the alleged class by the settlement and dismissal of this action, they have also been unable to show that any
of those individuals were relying on [the pending action] . . .to
exonerate their rights. We fail to understandhow individuals could
have reliedon the possibility that some day a court might determine
that the suit was properfor class action determination ....171
The Pearson court made another, even more revealing observation: "Further, since no Rule 23(c)(3) notice of the maintenance of this litigation was
ever given or required to be given to nonparty members of the originally
alleged class, reliance by those individuals on this action to recover their
losses would be particularly misplaced."172 Courts that emphasize the
reliance interest of absentee "class" members overlook the fact that no
notice is required or generally given to the class (1) when the action is
filed, 173 (2) when class certification is denied in an appropriate case, 174 (3)
169. 59 F.R.D. at 277.
170. 522 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1975).

171. Id. at 176, 178 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
172. Id. at 178. (emphasis added).
173. Rule 23 first requires notice to a class upon its certification pursuant to subsections
(b)(3) and (c)(1). See note I supra.
174. See cases discussed at text accompanying note 104-46 supra.
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when class certification, once conditionally granted, is for some reason
175
withdrawn before notice of the original certification is given to the class,
or (4) when the complaint or its class allegations are dismissed on the
merits. 176 In circumstances (2), (3) and (4), the effect upon the "class" is
precisely the same as if a dismissal without prejudice to the class had been
entered in a precertification individual settlement situation. Yet courts have
not thought the "reliance interest" of absentee class members sufficient to
justify notice of judicial action that, in effect, ends the lawsuit upon which
they allegedly have been relying. Indeed, the cases discussed in Part II(B)
are totally inconsistent with the reliance theory.17 7 Those cases refused to
require notice on the ground that a demonstrably invalid class does not, at
the precertification stage, trigger the notice requirements of rule 23(e).
In Seligson v. Plumtree, Inc. ,178 the district court conditionally granted
plaintiff's motion for class certification, but ordered that no notice be sent to
the class at that time. The court later concluded that "this action is inappropriate for class action treatment." , 179 On the-issue of notice to the conditionally certified class of its dissolution, the court held that "[s]ince no notice was
originallysent to prospective members, no one could have justifiably relied
Therefore we need not send
on our conditional class action determination.
180
notice of this dissolution of the class."
In Booth v. PrinceGeorge's County181 the district court held that when
the individual claims of a named plaintiff are mooted at the precertification
stage, "the complaint of the class must be simultaneously dismissed for
failure to set forth a case or controversy as required by Article I of the
Constitution." 182 The court dismissed the action, but noted that the dismissal "is without prejudice, and, should the plaintiff class succeed in producing
a new named plaintiff, no future action is barred by the Court's decision
here." 183 Significantly, the Booth court did not require notice of the
dismissal.
Requiring notice at the precertification individual settlement stage not
only fails to achieve any ascertainable policy objectives but can actually
undermine other, important policy goals. In most cases, the counterproduc175. See id.
176. See, e.g., Booth v. Prince George's County, 66 F.R.D. 466 (D. Md. 1965).
177. See text accompanying notes 104-46 supra.

178. 61 F.R.D. 343 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
179. Id. at 345.

180. Id. at 346 (emphasis added).
181. 66 F.R.D. 466 (D. Md. 1975).
182. Id. at 476.

183. Id.
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tive consequences of giving notice outweigh the perceived benefits in
protecting the so-called reliance interest of absentee class members.
3.

Policy Objectives Served by Not Giving Notice

Dispensing with notice, thereby permitting defendants and named
plaintiffs to settle privately and without prejudice to the purported class, will
reduce threats of class action litigation in prefiling settlement negotiations.
Of greater importance is the principle of settlement itself. Amicable settlement of private disputes without resort to legal process has always enjoyed
special favor and is highly encouraged, particularly in the sensitive area of
employment discrimination litigation, which accounts for a significant percentage of all class action filings. Written into Title VII and EEOC regulations is the stated congressional preference for conciliation and settlement
whenever possible; litigation is regarded as an undesirable last resort. 184 An
employer who has bought peace with a former employee is entitled to have
that agreement respected by federal district courts.
As the court noted in PhiladelphiaElectric, "a strong argument can be
made that the parties should be allowed to compromise [the issue of class
versus no class] . . .in advance of the court's determination.""8 5 In that
case the proposed settlement would have bound the entire class, not only the
named plaintiffs. Even so, the. court recognized that its "conclusion that
Rule 23(e) precludes court approval of the proposed settlements at the
present time is not a totally satisfactory one." 8 6 Even less satisfactory is the
situation involving only individual claims.
The notice requirement in Rothman left the parties' settlement agreement in ruins. Defendants decided they would rather fight to the finish than
give notice to the class and withdrew their offer to settle. 187 A similar
response can be expected from most defendants, who believe that rule 23(e)
notice deprives them of the essence of their bargain.
Finally, requiring rule 23(e) notice puts the district court in the unseemly posture of soliciting additional clients for the named plaintiffs' attorney.
The provocative aspects of "invitation to sue letters" are perhaps sufficient
in themselves to warrant dispensing with notice. When the inherent unfairness to defendants is taken into account, combined with the inevitable
contribution to court congestion that must follow, the balance should be
struck against giving notice. As the court in Elias correctly noted, "Rule 23
184.
C.F.R.
185.
186.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5()(1) (Supp. V 1975); EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29
§§ 1601.19A, .20, .22, .24 (1976).
42 F.R.D. at 328.
Id.

187. 52 F.R.D. at 497.
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does not require notice under these circumstances and to do so is in a sense
merely soliciting a client for plaintiff's counsel under the aegis of the court.
88
This would be improper."'
189
Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States District Court
involved claims stemming from the crash of a jet liner near Paris, France, in
March 1974. Numerous pending suits, including at least one alleged class
action, where consolidated in the central district of California. At the pretrial
stage, the district judge ordered defendants to produce the plane's passenger
list and announced his intention to notify potential plaintiffs of the pending
actions. 190 The aircraft manufacturer then moved that the judge not seek the
passenger list and that he refrain from sending notice to nonlitigants. Both
motions were denied.191 When defendants filed a petition for mandamus in
the court of appeals seeking to prevent the district judge from notifying
potential plaintiffs of the pending lawsuits, the Ninth Circuit held:
Notice from the court to potential plaintiffs not authorized
explicitly by statute or rule is so extraordinary that review of such
actions by mandamus will not frustrate the congressional policy
permitting appeals only from final judgments. . . . Furthermore,
erroneous notice to potentialplaintiffs cannot be remedied on appeal after final judgment. Petitionerscannot be relieved of the burden of actions filed in responseto such notice. . . . Finally, as will
appear, the disputed order is erroneous not because the district
court improperly resolved an issue properly before it but because it
acted without authority sanctioned by statute, rule or the equitable
powers of a Federal Court. 192
In response to plaintiffs' argument that the district court possessed
inherent equitable power to send the contemplated notice, the court of
appeals stated:
[WJe hold that such notice is neither required by the due process
clause nor permitted by any ascertainablesource of judicial authority.
• . . So long as the persons sought to be notified do not
become parties to these actions, they will not be bound by the
outcome. Hence they will not be adversely affected by these actions and need not be notified of them. . . . When no interest is
threatened, no notice is required.
Traditionallyin our judicialsystem, courtsarepowerless to act
until litigants bring claims before them. The issuance of notice to
188. 59 F.R.D. at 277.
189. 523 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1975).

190. Id. at 1075.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1076 (emphasis added).
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potential plaintiffs offends this principle in two ways: first, it permits a court to act upon a claim before it becomes the subject of a
lawsuit; and second, it permits a court to acquire jurisdiction by
encouraginglawsuits. So sharpa deviationfrom the traditionalrole
of the judiciary requiresjustification.Resort to a residualpower of
unspecified origin is insufficient.
• . . Sending the notice to prospective plaintiffs cannot be
grounded in the general equitable powers of the district court.93
The court also rejected plaintiffs' contention that notice should be sent
pursuant to rule 23:
The district court did not find, and the respondents have not
shown, that the action below meets the specific prerequisites of a
class action. .

.

. Respondents contend nevertheless that it falls

within the notice provisions of Rule 23 because a case may be
treated as a class action before it is found to be one. .

.

. Howev-

er, none of the cited cases supports the notice sought in this
case. .

.

. The admitted purpose of the notice in this case is to

bring the claims of unnamed members of the plaintiff class before
the court. Notice for this purpose usually has been thought to issue
only after certification of a class action. .

.

. For that reason,

notice for the purpose of bringing the claims of unnamed members
of the plaintiff class before the court may not issue before a class
action has been certified. 94
In the interim, the trial judge had certified a plaintiff class under rule
23, stating as grounds for class certification defendants' earlier opposition to
the court's proposed notice.' 95 Again, defendants sought a writ of mandamus to reverse the district court, and the Ninth Circuit again agreed.' 9 6
Where does all this leave us? The district courts have differed in
interpreting their responsibilities under rule 23(e). While notice should be
required in some precertification settlements, it cannot be justified in others.
193. Id. at 1077 & n.3, 1078 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
194. Id. at 1078-79 (emphasis added).
195. McDonell Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976).
196. Id. at 1086-87.

We have already held that the district court could not issue notice to unnamed
potential plaintiffs without first properly declaring a class action. The district court
cannot circumvent this holding by finding opposition to notice to be sufficient grounds

for a class action.
t ik The certification in this case constitutes a clear abuse of discretion sufficient
to invoke this extraordinary writ. Not only is the district court'sdecision contrary to
our holding .

. .

. it is also inconsistent with any tenable interpretation of Rule

23. . . . Repeated errors of this magnitude in applying the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure may be corrected by mandamus.
Id. (emphasis added).
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On occasion notice may serve legitimate policy goals. More often, however,
the giving of notice will have undesirable consequences. The nature of the
problem calls for flexibility rather than dogmatic rigidity on the part of the
courts. An open minded approach to rule 23(e) is needed, one that reconciles oftentimes conflicting policies and interests in fashioning an equitable
result for the unique circumstances of each case.

III.

A FLEXIBLE APPROACH

Communication is the key: (1) Communication (2) with the putative
class (3) by one or both of the parties or by court order (4) at the prefiling,
precertification or class action stage of the litigation is the source of most
rule 23(e) problems. Reasonable yet firm controls upon such communication not only can curb class action abuse but also can help to achieve the
genuine policy goals of rule 23(e).
Panaceas are beyond the scope of this article and the imagination of its
author. The problem of class action abuse generally, for example, can be
resolved by nothing less than a comprehensive reexamination, reevaluation
and, perhaps, redrafting of rule 23 itself. Within the confines of the existing
rule, however, the limited problems involving individual settlements of
alleged class actions can be dealt with effectively. Any solution to the
problems identified in this article must take several factors into account: (1)
Class action "strike suits," prefiling abuse, class "sell-outs" and other
abuses of rule 23 must be avoided and effectively deterred; (2) the interests
of the putative class must be protected against settlement, dismissals or
compromises that are binding upon them or otherwise prejudice their rights;
(3) reliance by nonparty class members upon alleged class actions at the
precertification stage must be prevented; and (4) the courts must be fair to
parties who wish to settle individual claims at the precertification stage. This
means rejection of procedures and proceedings that inject uncalled-for
delays, expense and obstructions into the settlement process when the rights
of others cannot reasonably be regarded as at stake.
Rule 23(e) notice is not a panacea. In most precertification individual
settlements, it is not even a good idea. The "prevention of abuse" rationale
is a classic example of too little, too late, and breeds its own peculiar brand
of prefiling abuse. The "reliance interest" theory ignores the realities of
modem legal practice: rarely does anyone rely upon an uncertified class
action and gratuitous, speculative presumptions to the contrary by federal
district judges must be rejected as false. Whenever reliance is a factor, it is a
demonstrable one; in the absence of evidence of such reliance, the court's
conscience ought not be troubled.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

Both abuse and reliance are engendered by the ability of named plaintiffs and defendants to communicate with the purported class or to publicize
the pending action prior to a ruling on class certification. If individual
settlements are not to be allowed except as supervised and monitored by the
courts, then certainly presettlement communication and publicity should be
subject to similar restrictions.
As one commentator has noted,
[T]he amended rule [23] has been taken as an invitation to solicit
litigation. Some attorneys have not been content with the notice
provisions of the rule, and have solicited clients either directly or
through trade associations and even by the use of salesmen paid a
commission for each class member recruited.197
Ethical considerations notwithstanding, the Madison Avenue techniques
employed in organizing some class actions present an embarrassing public
spectacle and degrade the legal profession. The publicity that often surrounds these self-promotional, organizational efforts can also foster the
much feared reliance by nonparty "class members," which often triggers a
rule 23(e) response from the court when the named plaintiffs attempt to
settle. As a study by the Harvard Law Review (Harvard Study) has
recognized, "These dangers are sufficiently serious to warrant some sort of
check on the attorney's communications with the class."' 19
If the courts can establish an effective control upon precertification
communication and publicity, many rule 23(e) problems will simply disappear. Reliance upon a lawsuit, for example, presumes actual knowledge of
it. Reliance, as a factor of legal significance for purposes of rule 23(e) at
least, can be eliminated by appropriate restrictions upon precertification
communication and publicity.
An absolute ban on communication, of course, will not do. Such gag
orders would probably violate the first amendment rights of plaintiff attorneys and would certainly interfere with their efforts to represent their clients
adequately. 1" Communication and publicity, while not to be prohibited,
can and must be regulated by the courts.
This is the approach favored by the Manualfor Complex Litigation.21
197. Simon, supra note 7, at 392. In Carlisle v. LTV Electrosystems, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 237,
240 (N.D. Tex. 1972), the court cited solicitation of potential class members as grounds for
refusing to certify the class.
198. HarvardStudy, supra note 8, at 1598.

199. See Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 508 F.2d at 162-63.
200. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.41 (1975).

Gag orders reverse the rule in ordinary litigation that communications between attorney and client are freely permitted and, indeed, encouraged. The apparent rationale

for this reversal is the court's fear that the class attorney may abuse communications
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The Manual's Suggested Local Rule 7201 and sample Pre-Trial Order No.
15202 both reflect an awareness that:
The class action under Rule 23 is subject to abuse, intentional
and inadvertent, unless procedures are devised and employed to
anticipate abuse. .

.

. To anticipate and prevent these abuses,

timely action should be taken by local rule or by orders in the
particular civil action or by both such means.
. . . [I]t is recommended that each court adopt a local rule
forbidding unapproved direct or indirect written and oral communications by formal parties or their counsel with potential and actual
class members who are not formal parties, provided that such
proposed written communications submitted to and approved by
parties desigorder of court may be distributed to the parties or
203
nated or described in the court order of approval.
The Harvard Study concludes that such limited restraints upon communication and publicity are desirable and suggests that "rule 23(d) should
be amended to give trial judges discretionary authority to establish procedures for screening communications with class members by both class
representatives and the class opponent." 2° The HarvardStudy then proposes that "rule 23(e) might be amended to make it clear that trial judges
have discretion in fixing notice requirements in the event of settlement.' '205
A number of courts have imposed restrictions upon communications
with the putative class. 2°6 Significantly, most of these courts have rejected
with the class. He may, for example, solicit fee arrangements or misrepresent the
benefits of participation in the class suit in order to prevent opt-outs. Another
rationale, arising from the attorney's need to subordinate some class interest to others,
is that the advice the attorney offers the class and the inquiries he makes of it may be
skewed. These dangers are sufficiently serious to warrant some sort of check on the
attorney's communications with the class. Any checks adopted, however, must be
narrowly drawn to avoid restricting the flow of information from or counseling to the
class.
HarvardStudy, supra note 8, at 1598.
201. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 200, app. § 1.41, at 211-12.
202. Id. app. § 1.41, at 212-13.
203. Id. § 1.41. Note that the Manual would regulate communication by either plaintiff or
defendant. Id. § 1.41 & app. § 1.41. Such an approach would forestall any attempted abuse of
rule 23 when, for example, the defendant might seek to undermine class certification by
"buying off" enough individual claims so that the numerosity requirements could not be
satisfied. See generally Dole, supra note 4, at 993-94.
204. HarvardStudy, supra note 8, at 1627.
205. Id. at 1628 (emphasis added).
206. Weight Watchers, Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 455 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1972);
Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc.,
71 F.R.D. 461 (N.D. Ind. 1976); American Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Harlow, 65 F.R.D. 572 (D. Md.
1974); Seligson v. Plumtree, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 343 (E.D. Pa. 1973). But see EEOC v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 727 (W.D. Mo. 1973), where the court stated:
Mobil Oil Corporation (Mobil) has moved the court for an order prohibiting communication with potential or actual class members. The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) opposes the motion. The motion will be denied.
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rule 23(e) notice for individual precertification settlements.2 °7 As the courts
in Seligson208 and Magana2°9 have observed, court supervision and
monitoring of communication and publicity can effectively eliminate any
justifiable reliance upon the pending action by absentee "class" members.
This article is not meant to suggest that rule 23(e) serves no useful
purpose at the precertification stage. PhiladelphiaElectric is good law-as

far as it goes. Settlements that compromise potential class claims require
notice to the potential class. When only individual settlements are involved,
however, and presuming reasonable restrictions are placed upon precertification communication and publicity as suggested above, notice should be
required if and only if there are in fact identifiable persons who may have

justifiably relied upon the actions being settled. Even then only those
identifiable individuals should be notified, not the entire alleged class, and

the form of such notice should be "scrupulously neutral."

210

Greater judi-

cial self-restraint must characterize the courts' attitude toward rule 23(e) in
the future. Only in this manner can an equitable balance be achieved
between the interests of the parties, particularly defendants, and those of the
class, whose existence at that crucial moment remains yet an unproven and
perhaps unprovable allegation.
• . . Mobil's suggestions are strained, unrealistic, and smack of corporate
paranoia. The court is singularly unimpressed with them.
Id. at 727, 728.
207. Weight Watchers of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l., Inc., 455 F.2d 770
(2d Cir. 1972); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 461 (N.D. Ind. 1976); American Fin.
Sys., Inc. v. Harlow, 65 F.R.D. 572 (D. Md. 1974); Seligson v. Plumtree, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 343
(E.D. Pa. 1973).
208. We specifically forbade notification to the class, as well as communication with
other potential class members regarding this action, in order to protect against reliance
by such potential class members before we made a final decision on class action
status.
This is an appropriatetime to dissolve the class determination.Since no notice was
originally sent to prospective members, no one could have justifiably relied on our
conditional class action determination. Therefore we need not send notice of this
dissolution of the class.
61 F.R.D. at 345-46 (emphasis added).
209. Obviously, recognition of this reliance interest presupposes that one or more class
members has actual knowledge of the pending class action. If there has been little, if
any, formal or informal publicity about the suit, then it is highly improbable that such
an interest exists in fact. Moreover, in view of LocarRule 6 of the Southern District of
Texas, which prohibits communications between any formal party or counsel to the
litigation and absent class members without court approval, it is highly improbable that
class members will possess knowledge of the action.
74 F.R.D. at 70.
210. See note 59 supra.

